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Abstract 
 
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) went farther than any other 
previous BRAC in attempting to discover budgetary efficiencies by redefining domestic 
military infrastructure.  BRAC recommendation #146 set into motion the construct of 
joint basing in which installation support responsibilities were transferred to lead-
Components resulting in 12 major mergers of 26 military installations.  Much has been 
written on the cost savings progress of joint bases; however little has been written in 
academia as to the implementation challenges that have hindered true cost savings from 
being realized.   
 This research leverages the Delphi Method in capturing and ranking the top issues 
to aid senior leaders in resource allocation decision-making.  Leaders from base support 
functions such as logistics, force support, security forces, civil engineering, and 
command staff comprised the expert panel that led to the identification of the top 13 joint 
basing challenges.  This research was scoped to one AF-led, Navy-supported joint base, 
but has transportability to other joint bases and contributes to the mergers and 
acquisitions body of knowledge.  The results of this research validate the current issues 
plaguing joint bases and consider the implications of future joint basing efforts. 
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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES OF JOINT BASING 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
 
 Necessity for Change:  General Case 
Resource constraints drive organizations, both large and small, toward decisions 
that reduce its fiscal footprint while, at the same time, improve efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Historically, businesses have accomplished this by downsizing their 
personnel, redirecting and repurposing assets, and reshaping their organizational mission.  
As time marches on, the operating environment inevitably changes which causes 
organizations to change as well or face the consequences of becoming irrelevant and 
ineffective.  The commercial sector has transformed itself as products become obsolete, 
competition intensifies, and stakeholders continue to demand that value be maximized 
and waste, as a corollary, be minimized.  The government arena, specifically the 
Department of Defense (DoD), is no different.  
  
Necessity for Change:  Military Case 
It is important to see the parallels between the DoD and commercial sector in 
order to understand why certain resource decisions are made.  The DoD produces a 
product (war and humanitarian assistance) for stakeholders (the American people) with 
resources (land/bases, personnel, assets, etc.).  The object of war and humanitarian 
endeavors continually shift in the strategic sense, which, in turn, drives operational 
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requirements.  Emphasis on suppression of communist influence during the Cold War 
necessitated heavy resource-staging across the world.  In today’s political environment, a 
lighter and more agile force has proven more appropriate against the current global 
threats.  Technological changes have increased the capability of both kinetic and non-
kinetic effects, further decreasing the need for Cold War-level resource-staging.   In the 
midst of technological advances and redirection of strategic mission, the U.S. fiscal 
environment has become more tenuous as the national debt and deficit continue to climb 
and the effects of sequestration and a slowly recovering American economy continue to 
severely restrict DoD spending.  One of the main vehicles used for reallocating of DoD 
resources was the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) of 2005 which birthed the 
concept of joint basing.   
 
Joint Basing 
The 2005 BRAC was utilized as the system for the timely closure and realignment 
of military installations inside the U.S (Department of Defense, 1990).  The impetus for 
this round of military base restructure was not only value creation through base closing 
but transformation as intimated by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in a 2004 report to Congress,  
“BRAC realignments will provide the flexibility to reconfigure forces to meet 
new and emerging threats and to capitalize on emerging technologies. Further, 
recognizing that military operations almost invariably involve multiple services, 
BRAC 2005 will focus on opportunities to collocate forces from multiple services 
in ways that enhance training and operational readiness.” 
          Department of Defense, (2004).   
  
The idea of transformation manifested in the form of joint basing, which was 
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labeled a priority for this round of base realignment (Defense, 2004).  As a result, 12 joint 
bases were created: 
• Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA: McChord Air Force Base (AFB) and Fort 
Lewis.  
• Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ: Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, 
Fort Dix, and McGuire AFB.)  
• Joint Base Andrews- Naval Air Facility Washington, MD: Naval Air Facility 
Washington and Andrews AFB.  
• Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, DC: Bolling AFB and Naval Station Anacostia.  
• Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA: Henderson Hall (USMC) and Fort Myer.  
• Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK: Fort Richardson and Elmendorf AFB.  
• Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI: Hickam AFB, HI, to Naval Station Pearl 
Harbor, HI.  
• Joint Base San Antonio, TX: Fort Sam Houston, Randolph AFB, and Lackland 
AFB.)  
• Joint Base Charleston, SC: Naval Weapons Station Charleston and Charleston 
AFB.  
• Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: Fort Eustis and Langley AFB, VA.  
• Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA: Fort Story and Naval 
Expeditionary Base Little Creek.  
• Joint Region Marianas, Guam: Andersen AFB and Naval Base Guam.  
(Office of the Defense Under Secretary of Installations and Environment, (n.d.) 
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In light of this move toward transformation, a study into the challenges of joint basing is 
useful. 
Problem Statement 
The relatively brief history of joint basing coupled with its recency has led to a 
gap in the academic literature regarding the topic.  Little has been written on its 
implementation challenges and issues even though many have experienced its effects.  
This research attempts to provide insight into the challenges and issues of merging two 
distinctly different bases with diverse mission sets into one functional joint base.   
Research Focus 
Current research zeroes in on the cost effectiveness of joint basing and leads to 
conclusions of whether the decision saves the DoD dollars over time, and ultimately, 
whether joint basing is a viable option for future BRACs.  The context of this particular 
study is that joint basing remains a current reality and it could be implemented again in 
the future in order to achieve a greater degree of Service jointness.  This may or may not 
result in overall cost savings.   An evaluation of all the joint bases that resulted from the 
2005 BRAC would, no doubt, bear fruitfulness in highlighting the challenges that result 
from base mergers; however this study is scoped to one Air Force led joint base.  Even 
though base consolidations have a wide variety of combinations between the 
organizations being joined, especially in terms of mission, geographic location, Service 
culture, personnel systems, and Service leads; the support functions (i.e. manpower, 
logistics, security) share some common components that make the single base sample 
generalizable and useful.  The functions providing research data represent base support 
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functions vice operations (flying, training, fighting, etc.), since the impetus for joint 
basing is consolidation of resources and support functions.   
Investigative Questions 
The concept of joint basing fundamentally veers away from the path that BRAC 
has historically travelled; therefore it would be useful to study the issues inherent in the 
process.  The first area of concern is unity of publications and governing instructions 
given that joint base lead Services bring the supported Service(s) into compliance with its 
Service-specific instructions, regulations, and headquarters directives.  Manpower is 
another interesting topic as supported organizations under the coordination of the lead 
Services follow differing staffing philosophies, especially with regards to civilian 
manpower.  Next, financial systems of joining bases may be problematic since working 
capital funds could be converted to fully manned/funded operations and vice versa in 
order to have a unified funding process.  Finally, the organizational structure up and 
down the chain of command could present some challenges as there is no “joint base in 
the sky” to give full implementation direction to each joint base.  Much of the decision-
making falls on local joint base leadership with general guidance from the lead-Service 
headquarters. The following investigative questions provide clarity to these curiosities: 
IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, 
and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?  
 
IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing? 
 
IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in 
mission impact?   
 
IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the 
joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?  
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Methodology 
The primary data gathering method used in this research is the Delphi technique.  
Much of the information regarding joint basing challenges resides in the experiences of 
the personnel navigating its waters.  A purely quantitative research method may provide 
insight into a function’s performance, but it cannot necessarily capture the ranking of 
issues.  The Delphi method utilizes both a qualitative (questionnaire) and quantitative 
(statistical analysis of answers) tool that leverages human intellect, opinion, and 
experience as well as providing quantitative context for the data (Linstone & Turoff, 
1975).  The objects of the study include functional “experts” from the mission support 
field, as identified by joint base leadership. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The assumptions of this research are listed:   
• The panel of “experts” have adequate knowledge concerning joint basing 
challenges to represent the opinions of their particular function in the 
study 
 
• The results of the study are general enough to be generalizable to other 
joint base constructs  
 
• Operational functions should not be considered for inclusion in the expert 
panel due to the base support nature of  the joint basing 
 
• The Delphi Study is an appropriate tool to unearth valuable insights into 
joint base challenges  
 
• Future BRACs will consider expanding joint basing giving further utility 
to this study 
 
While it would be beneficial to study the implementation challenges of all twelve 
joint bases, this study will be limited to one.  This is due to the time constraints of the 
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study and complexity.  The narrow focus may not capture the entire complexity of 
operations and may not be completely transportable to some joint base locations.  
  
Implications 
The results of this study will provide insight into the challenges of joint basing 
with various benefits to stakeholders at different organizational level.  First, the site 
specific nature of the study will give an academically rigorous backing to joint base 
installation resource gaps, whether personnel, funding, or assets.  Also, the research will 
validate the anecdotal information concerning the implementation challenges through the 
lens of an iterative research methodology.  From an academia perspective, the results of 
the study will lead to generalizable results in the context of “business” mergers within the 
Department of Defense.  Lastly, and most far-reaching, a deep dive into the 
implementation problems and issues from a construct as new as joint basing will provide 
opportunities for focus and improvement for current joint bases and lessons learned 
should the next round of BRAC include further base consolidations. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature that addresses the 
precursors to joint basing by analyzing the pre-2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) rounds, 2005 BRAC that led to joint basing, critiques of joint basing, and a 
review of corporate merger findings.  The BRAC rounds in the late 80’s and 90’s proved 
to be a paradigm shift in the way the Department of Defense realized cost savings via 
infrastructure cuts.  The 2005 BRAC commission approved recommendations that were 
much more far-reaching than previous base closure rounds and created the construct of 
joint basing.  In a non-governmental view, joint basing can be viewed as a corporate 
merger; therefore a look into the corresponding literature on mergers and acquisitions is 
warranted. 
History of BRAC 
Overview 
The 2005 BRAC provides the backdrop for the purpose of this research; however 
it is crucial to review previous BRAC rounds that set the precedent for military base 
drawdown and consolidation.  Before the idea of transformation via joint basing was 
birthed in 2005, the burning platform of burgeoning military spending, changing political 
climates, and shifting mission priorities resulted in drawdown of military installations 
decades earlier.  A look at BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 set the stage for 
BRAC 2005 in which joint basing was created. 
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Pre-BRAC Years 
The pre-BRAC years, spanning the 1960’s to the late 1980’s, were marked by 
distrust between Congress and the Department of Defense on the closure and realignment 
of military installations.  In the 1960’s, the DoD working in concert with the executive 
branch, unilaterally closed 60 major military installations as part of the largest 
restructuring in U.S. history (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988).  The criteria for determining 
which installations would be affected were established by the DoD in absence of 
Congressional approval (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988).  The political windfall resulting 
from the closure and realignment program constrained Congress to enact legislation to 
prevent the DoD from future restructuring efforts (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988).  President 
Carter approved legislation in 1977 requiring future programs to take into account local 
economic impacts along with environmental and strategic implications.  This legislation 
coupled with the Department of Defense requirement to give Congress advance notice of 
any installation identified as a candidate for closure halted most attempts at changing the 
military base infrastructure pre-BRAC (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988).  This stalemate 
between the executive and legislative branch was broken in 1988 with the advent of the 
Base Realignment and Closure commission. 
 
1988 BRAC 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was commissioned on May 3, 1988 for 
the purpose of recommending military installations for closure or realignment (Ribicoff 
& Edwards, 1988).  The goal of the 1988 BRAC was to reduce cost and improve the 
national defense structure through improving military installation efficiency (Ribicoff & 
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Edwards, 1988).  In years previous to the 1988 commission, Congress prevented military 
installation closures by requiring that any bases with more than 300 personnel be 
approved by Congress with additional requirements to comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988).  The new legislation authorizing 
base realignment and closure via an independent and bipartisan commission overruled the 
decade-old way of direct Congressional approval and allowed the Department of Defense 
to reevaluate the military value and cost effectiveness of its installations (Ribicoff & 
Edwards, 1988).  The military value factors, which became the basis for closure and 
realignment for the 1988 BRAC, are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Military Value Factors and Physical Attributes: 
Military Value Factors (1988 BRAC) 
Mission Suitability 
Availability of Facilities 
Quality of Facilities 
Quality of Life 
Community Support 
 Adapted from Ribicoff & Edwards (1988). 
 
The commission in consideration of the military value factors ultimately decided on 145 
actions affecting military installations with 86 of those fully closing bases (Ribicoff & 
Edwards, 1988).  The 1988 BRAC was the template for further realignment and closure 
efforts. 
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 1991 BRAC  
The 1991 BRAC continued the multi-year installation realignment and closure 
program by justifying drawdown on the basis of America’s post-Cold War status.  A 
focus for this round of BRAC was the reduction of domestic military bases. In total, 43 
base closures and 28 realignments were approved by the commission promising savings 
of $6.5 billion (Department of Defense, 1991).  A force structure plan was submitted to 
Congress assessing national security threats, addressing projected military end-strength in 
light of the reduced Soviet threat, and substantiating the need for continued overseas 
basing (Department of Defense, 1991).  The criteria presented to Congress for installation 
closure and realignments are presented below: 
• Military Value 
o Current and future mission requirements 
o Availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace 
o Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total 
force requirements 
o Cost and manpower implications 
• Return on Investment 
o Extent and timing of potential costs and savings 
• Impacts 
o Economic impacts on communities 
o Ability of communities to support forces, missions, and personnel 
       (Department of Defense, 1991) 
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1993 BRAC 
The 1993 BRAC commission emphasized the declining Deparment of Defense 
budget and across the board military manpower reductions as the burning platforms for 
further installation closures and realignents (Department of Defense, 1993).  Reduced 
spending for oveseas military bases and reduction of the overseas military footprint were 
emphasized as major vehicles for reinvestment in the U.S. (Department of Defense, 
1993).  The commission recommended 165 actions that included 31 major base closings 
with projected savings of $3.1 billion (Department of Defense, 1993).  The military value 
criteria used in 1993 was almost identical to that of the 1991 BRAC with the one addition 
of enviornmental impact (Department of Defense, 1993). 
 
1995 BRAC 
 The impetus for BRAC ’95 was the thinking that Department of Defense 
infrastructure should fall in line with the 1/3 reduction of military personnel over the 
previous decade (Department of Defense, 1995).  In the end, the 1995 commission 
reduced continental U.S. infrastructure by 21% (146 installations closed or realigned) 
with $4 billion promised in savings over the following six years (Department of Defense, 
1995).  The criteria for base closure and realignment remained the same in 1995 as 
previous years; however the method of savings generation expanded to the closure of 
Army, Navy, and DLA depots/shipyards along with reducing activity at the Air Force’s 
Air Logistics Centers (Department of Defense, 1995).   
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 BRAC Impact 1988 to 1995 
 The Base Realignment and Closure construct busted the logjam of efforts to 
reduce the domestic military infrastructure in the new post-Cold War era.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that only four bases were closed in the decade prior to the first 
BRAC (Department of Defense, 1995).  Figure 1 captures the cost savings of the BRAC 
actions from 1988-1995.
                         Figure 1:  BRAC Costs & Savings (Department of Defense, 1995). 
The BRAC process resulted in the closure and realignment of hundreds of domestic DoD 
installations and billions of dollars in savings. The 2005 BRAC process went further than 
previous rounds by not only considering cost savings, but also military transformation. 
BRAC 2005  
Overview 
The 2005 BRAC was unique amongst other rounds of closure and realignment, in 
that, it not only sought to reduce military domestic infrastructure, but also transform the 
way bases were administrated.  Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear that this round 
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of BRAC would focus on achieving a level of jointness in installation operation (Principi, 
2005).  The resulting recommendations by the Department of Defense were deemed 
“more complex than “all four previous base closure rounds combined” (Principi, 2005).  
A total of 190 recommendations were made by DoD with the independent commission 
approving 119 outright and 45 others “with amendments” (Principi, 2005).  Eight criteria 
for closure and realignment were approved and are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2:  2005 BRAC Criteria (Principi, 2005). 
 
The most compelling changes made in this round of BRAC was the idea of joint basing 
Joint Basing 
Recommendation #146 of the 2005 BRAC established 12 joint bases with the 
purpose of consolidating base support functions and transferring installation management 
responsibilities to a lead-Service (Principi, 2005).  The criteria for determining the lead-
Service (receiving installation) was derived from a military-value score, which evaluates 
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the ability of an installation to “absorb new missions or provide surge capabilities” 
(Principi, 2005).  The final tally of Service-led bases: 
 
• 2 Army-led 
o Joint Base Lewis-McChord 
o Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 
• 6 Air Force-led 
o Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst 
o Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson 
o Joint Base San Antonio 
o Joint Base Charleston 
o Joint Base Langley-Eustis 
o Joint Base Andrews 
• 4 Navy-led 
o Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling 
o Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 
o Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story 
o Joint Region Marianas 
                   (Daniel, 2010) 
A recommendation made by the BRAC commission was to create a common 
language by which Services could measure their performance within the context of the 
joint base (Principi, 2005).  The Department of Defense’s response to this 
recommendation manifested into common output level standards (COLS). 
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Common Output Level Standards 
DoDI 4001.01 defines COLS as  
Output or performance level standards established by the Department of Defense 
for installation support using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output 
performance metrics, and cost drivers for each installation support function. These 
standards provide a description of the capability associated with the particular 
installation support function. Where appropriate, standards will be tiered to 
provide options for managing risk.    (Department of Defense, 2008). 
 
A major transformation such as joint basing where a Service transfers installation 
support responsibility to another Service requires some way to measure performance in 
the form of cost savings and mission accomplishment.  This would be impossible in the 
absence of common terms and definitions for various types of installation support, thus 
the COLS were born.  The COLS break down to 11 program elements and 247 individual 
standards.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the full list of program elements with the 
corresponding number of subcategorized standards over the last three fiscal years along 
with a subset of specific standards, respectively. 
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Figure 3:  Program Elements & COLS (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014) 
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Figure 4:  Logistics Support COLS Example (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014) 
 
In reference to Figure 3, the Base Support Vehicles & Equipment function involves 
providing vehicles and equipment (without and/or without an operator), vehicle 
maintenance services, and transportation services (Joint Basing Installation Support, 
2014).  In this specific case, the vehicle support function is defined along with a standard 
service level for all joint bases.  While the COLS support the vision of jointness in BRAC 
2005 in terms of improved performance as a goal, the main driver for joint basing, and 
the reason for this and previous BRAC commissions, was cost savings.  It is important to 
review the literature for an analysis on joint base cost savings. 
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Joint Basing Cost 
 Overview 
 If the main driver of BRAC is to increase the efficiency of domestic military 
installations in order to maximize value to the taxpayer, then it is appropriate to compare 
the original promise of BRAC 2005 cost savings with cost savings actually realized in the 
literature, especially with regard to the phenomena of joint basing.  The Department of 
Defense claimed that $47.8 billion would be saved as a result of the 2005 BRAC 
(Principi, 2005).  An analysis of that claim is given in the next sections. 
 
 2005 BRAC Commission Critique 
 The 2005 BRAC commission discounted and revised the DoD’s original cost 
savings projection to be gained as a result of base closures, realignments, and joint basing 
claiming that the $47.8 billion in savings was actually closer to $15 billion over 20 years 
(Principi, 2005).  The commission felt that the military manpower savings factor 
calculated by the Department, which was calculated based on the reassignment of over 
26,000 military personnel, would not translate to actual cost savings (Principi, 2005).  
The commission claimed that, in absence of actually cutting these positions, real savings 
could not be achieved even though military effectiveness would increase due to personnel 
being reassigned to higher priority missions (Principi, 2005).  If the military manpower 
savings due to reassignment versus elimination are not realized, the one-time upfront cost 
estimation of $21 billion significantly reduces the cost savings claims (Principi, 2005).  
While this critique was written pre-BRAC, it would be interesting to review the analysis 
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by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with regard to post-BRAC cost 
analysis. 
 
GAO Critique on Joint Basing Cost Savings 
 A summary of GAO reports evaluating joint basing cost savings is given: 
• Joint basing projected cost savings are not validated since they derived from a 
formula rather than through deliberations of commanders in the field and in 
absence of actual manpower studies (Government Accountability Office, 2007) 
• The personnel requirements for joint basing are difficult to surmise, thus making 
it equally difficult to estimate accurate cost savings.  Projected cost savings are 
estimated at 58% less than original projections (Government Accountability 
Office, 2007) 
• Joint basing implementation efforts actually decreased the originally projected 
annual net savings by $84 million which was the largest decrease for any of the 
2005 BRAC recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2009) 
• New joint basing standards require some installation service level areas to 
actually increase from pre-BRAC levels as a result of increased administration 
costs and loss of efficiencies (Government Accountability Office, 2009)  
 
A more recent GAO report regarding joint basing written in 2012 addressed joint basing 
efficiencies to a greater depth than before.   GAO claimed that joint basing savings 
projections had dropped off by 90% and that the DoD lacked a method to effectively 
track cost savings (Government Accountability Office, 2012).  In the report, GAO 
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concluded that the newly formed joint bases would cost more joined than as separate 
installations (Government Accountability Office, 2012).   The GAO directly challenged 
the COLS as an effective method, in its current form, to provide a common framework 
for installation support since reporting of the standards were, in some cases, Service-
specific and not common at all (Government Accountability Office, 2012).  Additionally, 
some definitions of support standards were still deemed unclear (Government 
Accountability Office, 2012).  As follow-on, the GAO identified joint basing as a “high 
risk” area due to DoD official’s lack of a reliable implementation plan to achieve cost 
savings (Government Accountability Office, 2013).  According to GAO, 
In regard to joint basing, DOD has established 12 joint bases. However, DOD has 
not developed (1) an implementation plan to guide joint bases in achieving 
anticipated cost savings and efficiencies goals, (2) a reliable method of collecting 
information on the net costs or estimated savings and efficiencies, (3) a consistent 
interpretation and reported use of the common standards by the joint bases, (4) a 
process to prioritize the review and identify potential revision of those standards, 
(5) a communication strategy to meet the needs of joint base officials, and (6) 
guidance to the joint bases on developing training materials to be used to inform 
incoming personnel about the specifics of how installation services are provided 
on joint bases. (Government Accountability Office, 2013). 
 
The report concludes that the promise of an immediate payback period on joint basing 
upfront costs had not been honored by the DoD based on the commissions original report 
(Government Accountability Office, 2013).   
 
Mergers 
 Overview 
 The joining of bases can be viewed in terms of corporate mergers.  It is important 
to distinguish between mergers and acquisitions since both are sometimes used 
interchangeably; however the differences are important.  An acquisition is the case of one 
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organization subsuming another by transferring the assets; thereby maintaining the 
original identify of the acquiring firm.  (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  A merger, 
on the other hand, is defined as two or more firms joining to form a brand new entity 
(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  One could argue that, in the case of joint basing, 
one installation is acquiring the other’s assets and personnel and define the joining 
together as an acquisition.  In another vein, one could make the argument that the 
Services are merging at the installation level to form a unique entity as is the case of 
mergers.  Whether by merger or acquisition, it would be fruitful to review the literature of 
mergers to understand more about joint basing. 
 
 People Considerations in Mergers 
 In a 2005 case study, Ullrich discovers that among two merging firms, the 
employees attributed significant value to the strong culture of their pre-merger 
organization and placed value in identifying as one of its members.  This is an interesting 
parallel to joint basing since each military Service exhibits its own unique organizational 
culture.  In the case study, members of the merging organizations reacted negatively to 
the loss of organizational identification due to the fast-paced nature of the merger 
(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  Ullrich (2005) points to structural and procedural 
uncertainty as the general category of feelings experienced by merging employees in the 
new organization, such as the difficulty in knowing who to contact for vital information, 
the challenges presented by additional levels of bureaucracy, and the fear of an unclear 
future.  In addition to uncertainty, merging employees struggled with the general category 
of symbols and symbolic actions from the top (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  
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Symbols were described as instances of one firm being underrepresented in key pre-
merger leadership meetings or not identifying with the merged firm’s new logo (Ullrich, 
Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  Symbolic actions from the top were characterized as 
distrust of the new CEO who, in the case study, demanded more cost-saving, but also 
held meetings in locations that were seen as exorbitant in cost (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van 
Dick, 2005).  Table 2 summarizes the discontinuity employees experienced by way of 
uncertainty and symbolism. 
 
Table 2:  Themes of Uncertainty and Symbols Found in Merging Organizations 
 
                      (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005) 
A quote from employees in Ulrrich’s case study (2005) sums up their 
recommendations for implementation of the merger, “During the implementation of the 
new structure it felt like one was trying to shorten a pregnancy from nine to two months. 
Of course we are unsatisfied with the result, but now it is too late.”   
 
Stepfamily Metaphor 
 The step-family view of corporate mergers refers to the study of sociology; in 
that, corporations are much like families with mergers being akin to marriages (Allred, 
Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  This seems to fit in a joint basing context since the different 
military Services are like families who are quite different in the way they conduct 
24 
 
business.  Corporations, like the military Services, have their own culture, hierarchies, 
and interrelationships (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  Corporations are like to families 
since they are not static, but dynamic with different members taking on certain roles 
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  In the context of merger and acquisition, the acquired 
company takes on the role as the stepchild and is subordinated to its new corporate family 
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  Despite the situation where both corporate families are 
seen as equals, a dominant firm typically emerges (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  In 
the joint basing case, the supported Service could be seen as the acquired firm, since the 
supported service transfers installation support to the lead-Service.  In this case, the 
supported Service is the stepchild of the lead Service in the new military family.  The 
same consequences (shock and high stress levels) that family members experience in the 
course of joining a new family are much the same as in mergers and acquisitions (Allred, 
Boal, & Holstein, 2005).  Some of the issues that need to be resolved in a merger, much 
like a remarriage, are high failure rates and boundary problems (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 
2005).  Table 3 summarizes these points. 
 
Table 3:  Similarities Between Stepfamilies and Corporations Engaged in M&A Activity 
 
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). 
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According to Allred, Boal, & Hostein (2005), the success of a merger is influenced by the 
following factors: 
• Dissimilarity in things like culture, management style, and organizational 
structure 
• Problem children in the form of behavior problems like acting out, sabotage, 
providing misinformation 
• Commitment such as viewing the corporate merger as non-permanent 
 (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005) 
  
Stepfamily Metaphor Summary 
 The step-family metaphor seems reasonable in explaining why mergers and 
acquisitions are difficult to successfully complete.  In terms of the joint basing 
application, it is interesting to think of the lead-Service installations as subordinating the 
supported Service installations in a stepfamily type of relationship.   
 
Post-Merger Integration 
 A study into post-merger integration yields some insight concerning the process 
by which firms, or military installations in the case of joint basing, become one entity.   It 
is estimated that a half to two-thirds of mergers fail due to poor integration (Shrivastava, 
1986).  Integrating activities include: 
• Coordinating activities 
• Monitoring and controlling departmental activities 
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• Resolving departmental conflicts 
(Shrivastava, 1986) 
Why is integration necessary?  Shrivastava (1986) explains, “Integration is necessary 
because large formal organizations operate through functionally different departments 
that perform a narrow set of specialized tasks.”  Integration is a complex process that is 
influenced by variables such as the firm’s environment and size (Shrivastava, 1986).  
Firms have trouble integrating due to having their own unique systems and procedures 
and personnel show resistance to adopting a new way of doing things (Shrivastava, 
1986).  Shrivastava recognizes 3 types of post-merger integration, namely, Procedural, 
Physical, and Managerial & Sociocultural (Shrivastava, 1986).  Procedural integration 
refers to combining systems and procedures in order to standardize work at various 
levels, including legal entities, accounting systems, and strategic business unit (profit 
center) (Shrivastava, 1986).  Physical integration involves bringing together product 
lines, product technological systems, and immovable real estate (Shrivastava, 1986).  
Finally, Managerial & Sociocultural integration references the most difficult of tasks such 
as changes to the organizational structure, transferring personnel, maintaining morale and 
keeping employees motivated (Shrivastava, 1986).  Shrivastava (1986) contends that a 
phased approach to integration is best and causes the least disruption to the merging firms 
and that particular attention should be paid the sociocultural aspects since they are the 
most difficult to integrate (Shrivastava, 1986).   
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III. Methodology 
 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the methodology utilized in the research.  
The primary method by which insights were gathered on joint basing challenges was the 
Delphi Method.  The Delphi Method was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 
early 1950’s and utilizes expert opinion to obtain consensus on a topic (Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975).  Expert opinion was necessary in this study given the lack of available data 
necessary to answer the investigative questions.  The Delphi Method is particularly 
helpful when the researcher must use expert opinion as the sole source of information 
(Cuhls, 2003).  It is difficult to determine a specific metric that would point the 
researcher, unequivocally, toward the challenges of joint basing.  There is no shortage of 
manpower, financial, and mission data to analyze; however, it is choosing the correct one 
at the exclusion of others that would make a metrics approach arbitrary at best.  
Additionally, choosing the correct metric is only feasible when the research problem is 
clearly understood.  In this case, the Delphi Method does a good job of helping 
researchers understand a problem more clearly (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  
The best approach, and the one used in this research, was to gather a cross-functional 
panel of joint basing experts with the purpose of generating the appropriate data as part of 
a Delphi Study. 
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Method Overview 
The Delphi Method operates under the assumption that “two heads are better than 
one” or in the case of an expert panel, n-heads are better than one (Dalkey, 1969).  It was 
so-named after a Greek oracle from the city of Delphi in Greece.  An oracle was someone 
who was known for substantial wisdom and knowledge, especially in the realm of 
prophesies (Yousuf, 2007).  In this study, the panel of experts functions as “oracles” by 
leveraging a high level of expertise on the subject of joint basing implementation.  The 
panel of experts interacts with the researcher in a systematic process through the use of 
questionnaires (Yousuf, 2007).  One may question the use of opinion in a study, so it is 
useful to understand where it lies on the spectrum of validation.  Opinion lies in the 
middle of the scale in terms of the kinds of information a researcher can gather.  On the 
outer extremes are knowledge and speculation where there is a great deal of evidence on 
a subject and where is little or no evidence supporting a claim, respectively (Dalkey, 
1969).  It is in this middle area where the Delphi Method generates data.  The bedrock by 
which opinion becomes the basis for understanding of a subject is anonymity, iteration, 
controlled feedback, and statistical analysis (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). 
 
Anonymity 
 One of the features of the Delphi Method is its use of a panel of experts who are 
anonymous.  Panel members are truly anonymous when they can freely express their 
opinions in the absence of group pressure, where ideas are judged on their quality rather 
than their source (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  This is especially important in 
the context of a hierarchical type organization like the Department of Defense.  In such 
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an environment, panel members’ unique contributions could be lost through conformity 
(Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005).  In the study, panelists’ identities were kept 
anonymous by the use of questionnaires vice face-to-face interaction.  The questionnaire 
allows the researcher to act as the facilitator without the physical presence of the panel 
members (Yousuf, 2007).   
 
Panel Qualifications 
The term “expert” should be qualified to some extent in order to validate the 
expressed opinions.  The criteria used to determine expertise was: 
• Knowledge and experience with the topic 
• Capacity and willingness to participate 
• Sufficient time to participate through the duration of the study 
• Effective communication skills 
(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007) 
The panel’s knowledge and experience with the topic of joint basing proved strong with a 
combined 93 years of joint basing experience and 474 years of functional experience.  
Each expert had an average four years of joint basing experience and 20 years of 
functional experience.  Though four years of joint basing experience may appear low, as 
of this writing, joint basing was only six years removed from implementation.  
Additionally, panelists were identified by their commanders and/or directors as the 
resident joint basing experts at their installation.  In terms of functional representation, 
the panel spanned Logistics, Force Support, Security Forces, Civil Engineering, and 
Command Staff.    In addressing capacity and willingness to participate, all of the 
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panelists volunteered to take part in the study.  The tenor of the survey comments suggest 
that panelists were particularly interested in the topic at hand and were motivated to give 
their opinion.  Potential panelists were notified of the time commitment in advance as a 
precondition for their participation.  The effective communication aspect of the screening 
process was relatively easy to achieve since panelists represented senior level managers 
at their installation and require requisite communication skills for their position and 
grade.  The grade breakdown for the initial panel with quantity is illustrated in Table 4. 
Table 4:  Panel Grade Breakdown 
Military Officer Military Enlisted GS Civilian WS Civilian 
O-3 (1) E-7 (1) GS-11 (4) WS-14 (1) 
O-4 (2) E-8 (1) GS-12 (4)  
O-5 (2) E-9 (1) GS-13 (5)  
  GS-14 (1)  
 
With regard to the chosen number of panelists, between five and 30 yields the best results 
(Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005).   
 
Panel Demographics 
The heterogeneous or homogenous nature of the sample of panelists is an 
important consideration that will, ultimately, drive the number of panelists upwards or 
downwards, respectively.  A homogenous group allows for a smaller panel of 10-15 
people while a heterogeneous panel may require more (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 
2007).  The researcher felt that the cross-functional nature of the panel merited a larger 
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sample, so 29 potential participants were initially invited to join the study.  Ultimately, 23 
panelists agreed to participate.  The difficulty of surveying experts in a field is that they 
are often very busy which could lead to survey attrition (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 
2007).  Attrition is also realized since, as the study moves to later rounds, more effort is 
required and response rate drops off (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). 
Iteration and Controlled Feedback 
 Rounds 
 The Delphi Method is characterized by iteration, in that; panelists are allowed to 
refine their inputs in reaction to other group members’ feedback (Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007).  The panelists’ input is received in several rounds with a summary of 
results given from the previous round in order to move toward consensus (Dalkey, 1969).  
This study was designed with the intention of executing the process in three to four-
rounds; which is typically sufficient for most research (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 
2007).  The rounds were conducted by formal questionnaire.   
 
 Method of Interaction 
Delphi studies have typically been conducted by paper or electronic means 
(Cuhls, 2003).  Use of electronic means vice paper aids in keeping panelists engaged and 
motivated due to the quicker turnarounds of information (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 
2007).  The geographic separation of the researcher and panel members necessitated an 
electronic questionnaire via website and email.  The internet questionnaire and email 
(blind courtesy copy and one-on-one emailing) also helped achieve the aforementioned 
anonymity between the panelists.   
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Initial Questionnaire 
The first questionnaire contained one open-ended question for the panelists to 
answer in order to elicit unconstrained response and ideas (Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007).  The panelists should be encouraged to list as many items as necessary 
(Schmidt, 1997).  Though an open-ended question, as opposed to a focus question, is 
more time-consuming, it is important for the researcher to not lead the panel of experts to 
any conclusions (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  The open-ended question was 
stated as such: 
• What are the challenges of joint basing, either specific to your functional 
area or in general?  Please expound on your thoughts and provide 
examples as necessary.  Please provide a minimum of 3 challenges.  There 
is no maximum. 
The initial questionnaire was designed to validate the investigative questions, namely: 
IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, 
and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?  
 
IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing? 
 
IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in 
mission impact?   
 
IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the 
joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?  
 
The open-ended question design is an important aspect of this first step since panel  
Members can become frustrated or fail to give a meaningful response if the question is 
vague or confusing (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  The initial question was 
defined with the help of the research sponsor in order to avoid this pitfall. 
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Categorization Validation 
 Once the panel of experts answered the broad question, the researcher conducted 
an analysis of the answers.  The outcome of this analysis was a categorization of themes 
and the removal and/or consolidation of redundant answers (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  
In this joint basing study, it was the researcher’s intention to have the respondents rank 
the categorized items.  In order to achieve this, the list was pared down to achieve a 
meaningful ranking (Schmidt, 1997).  An important step before proceeding to the next 
questionnaire (in which the panelists rank the pared list), required the researcher to 
request feedback from the respondents regarding the categorization, or else it cannot be 
claimed that a valid list resulted (Schmidt, 1997).  Panelists were given the opportunity to 
clarify their comments and opinions or expand their answers (Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007).  This was accomplished by emailing the panelists their comments and the 
correlating categorization.  The respondent was given the opportunity to either accept or 
reject the categorization.  If rejected, the researcher would require feedback to 
appropriately re-categorize the item.  In this study, all of the panelists agreed with the 
schema. 
Paring the List of Issues 
 After validating the veracity of categorized responses, the researcher examined 
the list to determine if an appropriate number of items remained for the panelists to 
consider.  A list of 20 or less items is considered workable for a panel going into the next 
round (Schmidt, 1997).  It is important to note that the researcher should not take it upon 
himself to decide the top issues from the comprehensive list.  This task should be left up 
to the panel of experts (Schmidt, 1997).   A good rule of thumb in selecting the top items 
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is to keep only those selected by a simple majority of the panel (Okoli & Pawlowski, 
2004).  After a reasonable number of items are agreed upon, the group can move to the 
next phase.  An example of the process is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5:  Delphi study administration process (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004) 
 
Ranking 
 The consolidated, categorized, and validated list agreed upon by the panel was 
ranked in subsequent rounds.  The decision to press on with an additional round or to stop 
the polling is an important one.  If too few rounds are executed, the result may not be 
significant while too many rounds may lead to a greater level of panelist attrition 
(Schmidt, 1997).  According to Skulmoski (2007), a good stopping point is reached when 
the panel achieves consensus.  The panelists are asked to rank the final list of items, 
which should be distributed randomly to avoid order bias (Schmidt, 1997).  The 
individual joint base challenges were alphabetized in the rank-order questionnaire to 
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avoid this bias.  The idea of controlled feedback was woven throughout this process.  
Panelists ranked and re-ranked items in subsequent rounds with input from the entire 
panel until consensus was reached.  The power of the Delphi Method comes into play 
here since it is more difficult to achieve consensus through direct interaction than through 
anonymous survey iteration (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  An example of the second 
questionnaire, asking the respondents to rank the issues, is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6:  Ranking Questionnaire Example 
Comments were integral in latter rounds to justify an expert’s ranking and aided in 
timelier consensus (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  Joint basing panelists were given the 
opportunity to justify and/or explain their ranking via a comment box on the online 
survey instrument.  The use of statistical analysis is integral in the feedback loop to the 
expert panel and in deciding when an adequate level of consensus is reached. 
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Statistical Analysis 
 Overview 
 Statistical group response of the experts’ opinions ensured that every individual 
opinion was represented in the final result (Pill, 1971).  The aggregated individual 
opinions minimized the biasing of dominant panelists and ensured opinions were not 
unduly influenced (Dalkey, 1969).  Additionally, statistical analysis provided an avenue 
for the researcher to know when to halt the study (Schmidt, 1997).  The primary methods 
used in the research to achieve these ends were the Kendall’s W and Response Data-
Based Weighted Mean method. 
 
 Kendall’s W Coefficient of Concordance 
 Since the ultimate goal of the iterative ranking was for the panelist to achieve 
consensus, an objective measure was used to determine at which point consensus is 
achieved.  Kendall’s W Coefficient of Concordance was the measure utilized in this study 
to determine the stopping point of the rounds.  Kendall’s W is considered the best 
statistical measure of non-parametric rankings (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  This method 
utilizes a least-squares solution to measure expert agreement and provides a comparative 
way to measure concordance round-to-round (Schmidt, 1997).  Schmidt (1997) points out 
that it is a relatively simple measure that is easy to understand, making it a great fit for a 
Delphi Study.  The range of values produced by Kendall is between 0 and 1 with the 
former signifying little to no agreement and the later representing perfect concordance 
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  The range of values and their corresponding meanings are 
illustrated in Table 5. 
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Table 5:  Interpretation of Kendall’s W:   
W Interpretation Confidence in Ranks 
.1 Very weak agreement None 
.3 Weak agreement Low 
.5 Moderate agreement Fair 
.7 Strong agreement High 
.9 Unusually strong agreement Very High 
Adapted from Schmidt (1997). 
 
Once Kendall’s W value reaches .7, then the panel ceased iterating the rankings as a 
satisfactory level of consensus had been reached (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  In the case 
of a W value falling below the threshold, the feedback was sent to the panelists and the 
next round began, unless the value leveled off or the experts no longer wished to 
participate in future rounds (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  Even in the case of relatively 
low values of W, the results could still yield statistical significance if the panel is large 
enough relative to the population (Schmidt, 1997).  In this study, the panel members 
represented a large majority of the joint basing experts at the installation being observed.  
According to Kendall (1990), the Coefficient of Concordance is calculated by the 
following formula: 
2 3
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Where S = sum of square deviations of the rankings 
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            n = the number of objects ranked 
 m = the number of judges 
The more the experts agree with one another on the ranks, the bigger the deviations 
become, and as a result, the coefficient gets larger (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990).  Another 
measure utilized in the study was the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean method. 
 
 Response Data-Based Weighted Mean Method 
 While Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance is the quantitative measure of 
consensus for this study, a method was necessary to determine the final group rankings 
from each round.  This was accomplished by way of the Response Data-Based Weighted 
Mean method.  This method is necessary when the researcher believes that the degree of 
disagreement should be factored into the overall measure and it is especially robust in 
minimizing the effect of data outliers (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002).  When 
compared to an on-weighted mean, as is typical in a Delphi Study, this particular method 
reduces mean absolute percentage error by a greater amount (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 
2002).  The formula for the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean: 
xij ij xiDIST X UNWMEAN = −   
In this first step, the absolute distance between each response and the associated un-
weighted mean (arithmetic mean) is taken, where: 
Xij = a particular response, j (rank) in a particular group, i (item among the list of items) 
Next, a weight is computed for each response (individual rank), where parameter α 
corrects for systemic error (reference value of 1): 
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Finally, the weighted mean is measured, penalizing or rewarding panel members, 
depending on the distance of their response to the un-weighted group mean: 
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This approach to determining group ranking from each round typically revolves around 
the median and standard deviation.  However the median is a poor measure of central 
tendency when the dispersion is large (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).   
 
 Statistical Analysis in Controlled Feedback 
 Schmidt (2007) contends that more than just the mean (or in this case, the 
weighted-mean), should be communicated to the panel of experts at the beginning of each 
round.  The other important feedback points are the Kendall’s W and any comments from 
the previous round that justify a ranking (Schmidt, 1997).  The researcher communicated 
the weighted-mean and the Coefficient of Concordance along with comments in the latter 
rounds of the Delphi Study via email.   
 
Limitations of the Delphi Method 
 One of the risks, among many, of utilizing a panel of expert methodology is the 
potential diluting of the foremost experts in a group by aggregating the opinion (Pill, 
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1971).  There is a tradeoff between interviewing one or two experts, thereby, potentially 
missing out on certain insights that others might have and increasing the panel to the 
point of dilution (Pill, 1971).  The researcher decided that it was far more harmful to 
utilize interviews in order to unearth joint basing challenges given the cross-functional 
nature of the installation.  Another limitation is that this method is time-consuming 
compared to other methods and could suffer panelist attrition (Hsu, 2007).  Despite these 
limitations, the Delphi Study is widely accepted as the method of choice when dealing 
with imperfect or insufficient knowledge in a particular area (Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007).  This certainly applies to the murky environment of joint basing where 
functional biases and the newness of the phenomenon have hindered rather than helped 
bring the real issues to light. 
 
Summary 
 The Delphi Method proved to be an appropriate way to generate data in 
determining the implementation challenges of joint basing.  The relatively new nature of 
this basing construct required the bringing together of the foremost experts to generate 
the issues and rank them in a meaningful way.  An anonymous, iterative approach to 
surveying works well in a vertical organization like the Department of Defense. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
IV. Analysis and Results 
 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to communicate the results of the joint basing 
Delphi Study.  The Delphi Method was utilized to elicit the opinions of a panel of experts 
who possessed intimate knowledge and experience concerning joint basing 
implementation.  Specifically, the panel was asked to brainstorm the top challenges of 
joint basing implementation and then participate in an iterative ranking of the issues until 
a final ranking was achieved.  In the following sections, the researcher will present the 
results of the study and connect the results to the original investigative questions. 
Results of Delphi Study 
Panel Selection 
The researcher selected the panel based on inputs from top managers and leaders 
in the targeted functional areas.  Leaders were asked to identify those within their areas 
with the most breadth and depth of experience regarding joint basing implementation.  In 
coordination with the research sponsor, the following functional areas were targeted: 
• Logistics (transportation, supply, aircraft fuels, vehicle management) 
• Force Support (manpower & personnel, food & recreation, family care 
programs) 
• Security Forces (force protection, armory, crime prevention 
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• Command Staff (safety, plans, legal, inspector general, joint base business 
office) 
• Civil Engineering (base infrastructure management, emergency 
management, facility management) 
         (Department of the Air Force, 2011) 
Potential panelists were contacted via email to request their participation in the study. 
They were informed that the study would require a commitment of three to four weeks of 
availability and that it would be conducted mainly via email and via an online survey 
tool. Ultimately, the study lasted for four weeks.  The researcher initially identified and 
contacted 29 potential panelists.  The breakdown of panelists contacted by functional area 
is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6:  Request for Panelists by Functional Area 
 
 
The researcher prepared a brainstorming round so that the panel could identify the joint 
basing implementation challenges to be ranked later in the study. 
 
 Round One:  Brainstorming 
 The expert panel was asked to brainstorm the top joint basing implementation 
challenges.  The online survey was open for seven calendar days with 23/29 panelists 
responding resulting in a 77% response rate.  The panelists were given one open-ended 
question and were encouraged to respond with their top joint basing implementation 
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challenges.  The question called for a minimum of three different joint basing challenges 
with no maximum.  The resulting panel of 23 members spanned all of the targeted 
functions and is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7:  Round 1 Panelists by Functional Area 
 
 Round One:  Coding and Categorization 
The panel contributed 106 individual joint base challenges in the brainstorming 
round (see Appendix A).  It was then incumbent on the researcher to pare down the list to 
less than 20 individual challenges for the panel to rank (Schmidt, 1997).  Table 8 
summarizes the contributions of the panelists by number of issues and functional area: 
 
Table 8:  Round 1 Contribution of Issues by Functional Area 
 
 
The categorization effort consisting of consolidation of themes resulted in a list of 30 
issues as illustrated in Table 9.  They are presented in no particular order. 
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Table 9:  Categorized Listing of Issues from Round 1
 
 
An example of the categorization effort is shown in Table 10.  In this particular 
categorization, four separate statements were consolidated under ‘Budget Cuts’.  In terms 
of contribution to this category, two Logistics experts, one Command Staff and one Force 
Support panelist gave input under the Budget Cuts heading.  The bolded print represents 
key information that the researcher keyed in on to make the coding decision. 
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Table 10:  Budget Cuts Coding
 
 
The entire list of categorized challenges is given in Appendix A.  After categorization of 
the issues was accomplished, the researcher sent the categorized issues back to the 
panelists for validation that the essence of their input was accurately interpreted.  
Panelists were given four days to respond with 20/23 panelists responding.  All 
responding panelists agreed with the classification schema.   
 
 Round One:  Paring Down the List  
 The resulting list of 30 issues was still too many for the panel to effectively rank.  
The researcher considered two different ways to reduce the list to a level below 20 total 
issues.  The first method focused on the number of mentions by category.  In this schema, 
the number of mentions could include the same panelists pointing out an issue more than 
one time in their survey response. The results are given in Table 11. 
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Table 11:  Categories by Number of Times Mentioned and Functional Area 
 
The second method disregarded multiple mentions of a single issue by a single panel 
member and focused on the number of panelists that addressed the same issue.  The result 
is given in table 12. 
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Table 12:  Categories by Number of Individual Panelist Mention 
 
 
Since the object of the Delphi Study is to achieve a level of consensus, the researcher 
chose the second method.  The researcher started eliminating categories from the list by 
taking out issues that were mentioned only once or twice until a manageable list was left.  
In the end, 13 issues were identified as illustrated in Table 13. 
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Table13:  Resulting Round One List of Challenges  
 
The list of 13 items provided the basis for the next round of the Delphi Study in which 
the panel of experts ranked the issues. 
 
 Round 2:  Ranking the Issues 
 With the issues identified, the panel was given the opportunity to rank the issues 
from 1-13, with one being the most impacting issue of joint base implementation and 13 
representing least impacting.  The survey was open for three calendar days with 20/23 
panelists responding for an 87% response rate.  Table 14 breaks down the respondents by 
functional area.   
 
Table 14:  Round 2 Panelists by Functional Area 
 
 
50 
 
The respondent’s anonymity was maintained by way of an internet questionnaire.  
Panelists were given the opportunity to rank the 13 items, which were presented in 
alphabetical order, and invited the panelists to provide any comments via a comment box.  
Figure 7 depicts the survey along with descriptions of each issue.  The descriptions were 
based on the initial round one responses. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Round 2 Questionnaire 
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The results of panelists’ ranks are shown in Table 15 in two parts with the following 
identification schema: 
• L = Logistics 
• F = Force Support 
• S = Security Forces 
• C = Civil Engineering 
• CS = Command Staff 
 
Table 15:  Round 2 Rankings  
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Table 15:  Round 2 Rankings (con’t)  
 
 Round 2:  Ranking Analysis 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance was computed to determine the level of 
round one consensus.  Once again, values closer to .1 signify weak agreement and values 
closer to .7 represent very strong agreement.  Utilizing Kendall’s method, the round 2 
resulting value was .15 with a corresponding p-value of  >.001 (statistically significant at 
the .05 level); therefore, more rounds were needed to move toward consensus.  The 
Response Data-Weighted Mean Method (WDM) was computed in order to generate the 
final group ranking for round two.  The results of the round two ranking are given in 
Table 16. 
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Table 16:  Round 2 Weighted Mean Group Ranking 
 
 
The consensus level value and the final group ranking for round two were utilized as the 
foundation of round three. 
  
 Round 3:  Controlled Feedback 
 The panel of experts was given the opportunity to improve upon their individual 
rankings by the controlled feedback process.  The researcher conveyed to each panelist 
via email their individual rankings from the previous round (round two) and the final 
group rankings.  The round three questionnaire was open for five days with 17/20 
panelists responding achieving an 85% response rate.  A breakdown of the round three 
panelists by functional area is given in Table 17. 
 
Table 17:  Round 3 Panelists by Functional Area 
 
 
54 
 
Once again, the panelists were asked to re-rank the issues, 1-13, in light of the group 
ranking.  The researcher also offered the opportunity for panelists to give comments on 
their ranking, especially if it significantly differed from the group ranking.  The order of 
the items on the questionnaire was initially given in the group ranking order and panelists 
were given instructions to re-rank the issues.  The next round questionnaire is provided in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Round 3 Questionnaire 
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Round 3:  Ranking the Issues 
 To maintain continuity, panelists’ original designations were maintained.  For 
example, a panelist labeled ‘L-2’ in the previous round kept the same label throughout 
the study.   If ‘L-1’ were to drop out of the next round, then the panelist identified as ‘L-
2’ would still keep the same designation and not be re-named ‘L-1’.   The results of the 
round three ranking by individual panelist are given in Table 18.   
 
Table 18:  Round 3 Rankings 
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 Ranking Analysis 
 The consensus value for round three improved to .38 with a corresponding p-
value of >.001, which is significant at the .05 level.  Since the consensus value did not 
approach the .7 level of strong agreement, another round of rankings was required.  The 
weighted-mean method produced a round three group ranking that was different than the 
round two ranking.  Table 19 illustrates this point. 
 
Table 19:  Round 3 Weighted Mean Group Ranking 
 
The biggest movers in terms of rank among the issues from round two to three were: 
• Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (7 spots) 
• Lack of a joint base manpower standard (7 spots) 
• Perceived subordination to Lead Service (6 spots) 
• Incompatible Service Finance Methods (5 spots) 
The panelists were prepped for round four given the results of the round three consensus 
value. 
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 Round 4:  Controlled Feedback 
 As preparation for round four, the panelists were given their individual rankings 
and the round three group ranking as comparison points.  Two other pieces of feedback 
were given to the panel, namely, the consensus value from the previous round and any 
issues in which they were statistically different than the group ranking.  The statistical 
difference was determined by calculating the inter-quartile ranges (IQR) of the ranks for 
each issue.  If panelists were outside of the IQR for a particular item, the researcher 
pointed it out as a statistical outlier for consideration in the re-ranking.  The ranges and 
results are given in Tables 20 and 21 with the shaded regions in Table 21 representing 
ranks that were statistical outliers. 
Table 20:  Inter-quartile Ranges 
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Table 21:  Statistical Outliers of Round 3 Rankings
 
The round four questionnaire was open for four days with 15/17 panelists responding 
resulting in an 88% response rate.  Table 22 illustrates the round 4 panel make-up 
according to functional area. 
 
Table 22:  Round 4 Panelists by Functional Area 
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The survey presented the rankings in the order of the group ranking from round three.  
Panelists were encouraged to consider the group rankings in their assessment of the 
issues.  Round four questionnaire is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
   
Figure 9:  Round 4 Questionnaire 
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 Round 4:  Ranking the Issues 
 The results of the round 4 rankings are given in Table 23. 
Table 23:  Round 4 Rankings 
 
 
  
 Round 4:  Ranking Analysis 
 Kendall’s W for this round was calculated at .63 with a corresponding p-value of 
>.001 which is significant at the .05 level.  At this point, the researcher decided to end the 
study and forgo any further rounds of ranking for two reasons.  First, the consensus value 
of .63 is near enough .7 (strong agreement) to warrant satisfaction with the round four 
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group ranking.  The other reason to end the study was due to panelist survey fatigue and 
round-to-round panel attrition.  Thus, the round four group ranking represented the final 
ranking of issues for the study.  The final group ranking using the weighted-mean method 
is represented in Table 24. 
 
Table 24:  Final Ranking of Joint Base Challenges 
 
The most significant changes in these rankings from the previous round are: 
• Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (9 spots) 
• Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly (6 spots) 
Summary of Analysis 
 The panel of experts successfully generated a list of issues regarding joint basing, 
ranked those issues through several rounds of controlled feedback, and ultimately, came 
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to consensus on the order of the top 13 issues.  The final consensus value of .63 gives a 
strong indication that the final ranking of issues is a good representation of reality.   
Investigative Questions Answered 
Given the results of the Delphi Study, it is useful to reference the original research 
questions to determine if they have been appropriately addressed and answered. 
IQ 1.  
 
Do publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, and/or other 
mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing? 
 
Publication conflicts most certainly exist within the joint base construct.  This issue was 
generated by the panel of experts and ranked as the #3 issue on the final list of 13 top joint 
basing issues (difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure). 
 
IQ 2.  
 
Are there manpower challenges unique to joint basing? 
 
Manpower challenges were identified in the brainstorming round of this study and were 
agreed upon as the #6 joint basing issue (lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard).  The 
answer to this question is undoubtedly “yes”. 
 
IQ 3.  
 
Are there significant funding challenges unique to joint basing that have resulted in mission 
impact?   
 
Funding challenges were identified by the panel and ranked as the #1 issue of joint basing 
implementation (budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs). 
 
IQ 4.  
 
Is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the joint base, 
conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?  
 
The difficulties of joint base organizational structure were addressed in a couple of ranked 
issues, namely, #2 (difficulty merging organizational structures) and #11 (multiple chains of 
command create duplication of effort/costly). 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
The researcher, via the Delphi Study methodology, set out to illuminate the 
specific implementation challenges of joint basing.  Joint basing is a relatively new 
military installation support phenomenon and much needed to be learned in terms of the 
effective merging of Department of Defense organizations.  The information gained in 
this study, namely, the full list of top challenges, the pared-down list, and the final rank-
ordered list provided some context to the difficulty military organizations can experience 
when merging.   
The original list of 30 joint basing challenges generated by the panel of experts 
gives thorough context to the kinds of pain felt by senior managers and leaders within the 
logistics, force support, security forces, command staff, and civil engineering disciplines.  
The listing is given in Table 25. 
Table 25:  List of 30 Issues  
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Table 25 (con’t):  List of 30 Issues  
 
 
This data is significant since the responses represented the top issues on the minds of 
these leaders, and one could reasonably deduce that precious organizational resources, 
particularly time and attention, have been diverted to address them.   
The pared down list of 13 challenges represented the issues that mangers and 
leaders across multiple functional areas cared about the most.  It may seem unreasonable 
for a leader to tackle 30 challenges at once, so identifying the top issues is an effective 
way to focus organizational resources in order to achieve the biggest bang for the 
proverbial buck.  Furthermore, the top 13 challenges were rank-ordered by the panel of 
experts until the final list was achieved as illustrated in Table 27.   
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Table 26:  Rank-Ordered List of Top 13 Issues
 
 
The rigor and iterative process of the Delphi Study research method adds credibility to 
these findings, since the research topic experts were given opportunity to contribute 
opinions that were tempered and strengthened through consideration of the opinion of 
other experts.   
 In terms of the original investigative questions, the joint basing Delphi Study 
revealed some insights.   The panel of experts agreed that publication and policy 
differences between the joining Service installations were difficult to integrate, especially 
in terms of morale spending and equipment inspections.  Manpower challenges were 
revealed by the panelists as a significant source of merger pain given the effects of most 
efficient organization cuts by the supported Service prior to joint basing implementation.   
Additionally, a lack of a manpower standard to match unique joint basing needs has 
necessitated expensive contracts to fill in the manpower gap.  Funding issues presented 
themselves in the study in the form of budget cuts due to sequestration.  One could argue 
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that the cuts came at a most inopportune time given the entire gamut of challenges that 
come from merging two organizations.  Examples of organizational structure challenges 
were identified as multiple chains of command (the case of two different Air Force 
organizational hierarchies within the same joint base) and the case of having to report 
information to the different Services (via both Air Force and Navy chains of command).   
Significance of Research 
This study bridged the research gap in identifying the top challenges of joint 
based installations via a panel of expert study.  Though some has been written on 
reported challenges by joint bases either anecdotally or via GAO reports, there exists no 
consolidated, rank-ordered list for managers/leaders.  There are two contexts in which 
this information is useful.  The first context is the present one.  The top challenges 
intimated by the panel of experts are, in some cases, enduring issues that may or may not 
be truly resolved.  There is no doubt that workarounds have been created in order to 
achieve mission success; however the optimal case entails fundamentally addressing the 
difficulties with the full range of resources at the Department of Defense’s disposal.    
The second case is one in which future BRACs attempt to further expand joint basing, or 
in the extreme case, consolidate Services altogether.  The list of challenges gives future 
BRAC commissions some considerations for attempting joint basing again.  This is 
evident by the fact that GAO reports have correlated the lack of joint basing cost savings 
data with implementation challenges (Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
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Recommendations for Action 
This section is organized by the researcher’s and the panelists’ recommendations 
for actions.  The recommendations are given within the contexts of future joint basing 
attempts via the BRAC process.   
 
Researcher Recommendations 
The data suggests that there are 13 issues future BRAC commissions should 
consider when joining installations of different military Services.  Since the list is rank-
ordered by a cross-functional panel of experts, the issues ranked highest would have the 
broadest impact and, thus, should be addressed first.  Senior military leaders should focus 
departmental resources on the top issues, so that the original intent of joint basing, 
namely cost savings, will be realized in the absence of major implementation challenges. 
 
Panelist Recommendations 
Table 27 summarizes the panelists’ ideas to overcome implementation issues for 
future joint basing efforts.  The information is given in context of the top 13 challenges 
identified by the panel.  The full list of recommendations is in Appendix B. 
Table 27:  Panelist Recommendations
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Table 27 (con’t) 
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Table 27 (con’t) 
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Table 27 (con’t) 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
For future research, the researcher recommends the following: 
1. Replicate this study at another Air Force-led installation in order to 
validate the results. An additional study utilizing the Delphi method as the 
methodology at one of the other six AF-led joint bases would further 
strengthen the findings.   
2. Replicate this study at other joint bases with different combinations of 
Service-leads.  There are many different combinations of supported and 
supporting Components among other joint bases.  Delphi Studies 
concerning joint basing challenges on those bases would validate the 
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transportability of the findings and recommendations to joint basing at 
large. 
3. Utilize other research methods such as mass survey or interviews to 
validate the results of this study.  This study was conducted among a panel 
of the most senior personnel at the joint base being studied.  A general 
survey in the functions studied would glean the perspectives of those 
lower in the organization.  Interviews of senior leaders at the joint bases 
might yield even more information as to the specific issues as part of the 
general issues. 
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A.  Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t) 
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Appendix B.  Panel Recommendations 
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Appendix B.  Panel Recommendations (con’t)
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Appendix B.  Panel Recommendations (con’t) 
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Appendix B.  Panel Recommendations (con’t) 
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